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ABSTRACT
Modeling and analyzing security of networked systems is an im-
portant problem in the emerging Science of Security and has been
under active investigation. In this paper, we propose a new ap-
proach towards tackling the problem. Our approach is inspired by
the shock model and random environment techniques in the The-
ory of Reliability, while accommodating security ingredients. To
the best of our knowledge, our model is the first that can accom-
modate a certain degree of adaptiveness of attacks, which substan-
tially weakens the often-made independence and exponential attack
inter-arrival time assumptions. The approach leads to a stochastic
process model with two security metrics, and we attain some ana-
lytic results in terms of the security metrics.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]
General Terms
Security, Theory
Keywords
Security modeling, security analysis, security metrics
1. INTRODUCTION
The long outstanding problem of modeling and analyzing secu-
rity of networked cyber systems from a whole-system perspective
is yet to be tackled satisfactorily. One issue that hinders substantial
progress is the difficulty encountered in modeling the adaptiveness
of attacks. Indeed, existing models often assumed that the relevant
random variables are independent of each other (except [26]), and
the attack inter-arrival time follows the exponential distribution.
While these assumptions can lead to elegant results, it is important
to pursue models that can accommodate weaker assumptions.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to modeling and ana-
lyzing security of networked systems. Our model is inspired by the
shock model and random environment techniques in the Theory of
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Reliability, while accommodating security ingredients. The shock
model technique was originally used to describe the phenomenon
that systems (or components) may or may not fail due to “shocks"
— depending on magnitudes of the shocks [9]. This inspires us
to model attack and defense capabilities in the same spirit, namely
explicitly considering attack power and defense capabilities. The
random environment technique was originally used for describing
the external environment that has an impact on the performance of
systems, and for explaining the dependence between systems that
operate in the same environment [23, 16]. The random environ-
ment technique is appealing because it can accommodate a certain
degree of adaptiveness, which can be seen as the dynamic depen-
dence between attacks (rather than the static dependence recently
investigated in [26]).
1.1 Our Contributions
Our contributions are in two-fold. First, we propose a new ap-
proach to modeling and analyzing security of networked systems.
The approach allows us to accommodate a certain degree of adap-
tiveness of attacks, namely the dynamic dependence between the
relevant random variables. In contrast to a straightforward stochas-
tic model that encounters the state-space-explosion problem, we
obtain a n-dimensional stochastic model that leads to approxima-
tion results or bounds (which are numerically confirmed), where n
is the size of the networked system (i.e., number of nodes).
Second, the approach leads to two security metrics, called time-
to-compromise and steady-state compromise probability. The for-
mer captures the random time it takes for a secure (but vulnerable)
node/computer to get compromised, without requiring the system
to be in the steady state. The latter represents the probability that
a node/computer is compromised in the steady state. Although it is
hard to obtain closed-form expressions for these metrics, we man-
age to attain some analytic results centered on them. For example,
we show that when the defense is highly effective, we can obtain
some asymptotic result on computing the distribution of time-to-
compromise with much less information (i.e., the mean of a cer-
tain distribution rather than the distribution); when the defense is
poor, certain easier-to-obtain bounds are tight and can be used for
decision-making purpose. This hints that security of both highly ef-
fectively and poorly defended networked systems would be easier
to analyze than security of networked systems whose defense re-
sides in the middle of the spectrum. To the best of our knowledge,
this insight was not known until now.
1.2 The Science
This paper falls into the category of “mathematically model-
ing and analyzing security of networked systems," which is a core
problem in the emerging Science of Security, because it aims to
understand security from a holistic (or whole-system) perspective,
rather than from the point of view of individual computers or building-
blocks (e.g., protocols, mechanisms). This line of research is much
needed, but little investigated perhaps because of the difficulties it
imposes. As shown in the paper, such research can lead to secu-
rity metrics, which can be used to quantify (and therefore compare)
security of networked systems in a principled fashion. For exam-
ple, in risk management, one would need to know the probability
each computer is compromised at some point in time. Such proba-
bilities may be based on the steady-state compromise probabilities
of the nodes (i.e., “average case"-based decision-making) or based
on the upper-bounds of the steady-state (or transient-state) compro-
mise probabilities of the nodes (i.e., “worst-case"-based decision-
making). Other applications of such probabilities include: The de-
fender can deploy an appropriate threshold/proactive cryptosystem
to tolerate compromised nodes. In Byzantine Agreement scheme,
it is often assumed that no-more-than-one-third of the nodes are
faulty/compromised; this assumption can be (in)validated by using
the (upper bounds of) steady-state or transient-state compromise
probabilities of the nodes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new
approach and the resulting model. Section 3 analyzes the model.
Section 4 reviews related prior work. Section 5 discusses the limi-
tations of the model. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs are de-
ferred to the Appendix. The following table summarizes the main
notations used in the paper:
P(·),E[·] the probability and expectation functions
G G = (V,E) is attack-defense structure graph,
where V represents computers and E represents
the “direct attack" relation
deg(v) (in-)degree of node v ∈ V in G = (V,E)
c c = (c1, c2), where c1, c2 > 0 are defense capa-
bilities against push- and pull-based attacks
Jv random variable (local environment) abstracting
v’s compromised neighbors
πv,r probability mass function of Jv
Jv,i number of compromised neighbors of v ∈ V after
the (i− 1)th recovery, i = 1, 2, . . .
Θv random variable (global environment) abstracting
pull-based attacks against node v
Hv distribution function of Θv
Tv,c time-to-compromise metric
qv,c(t) distribution of Tv,c, qv,c(t) = P(Tv,c ≤ t)
q˜v,c(t) distribution of Tv,c as c1, c2 →∞
Tv,c,i the random time it takes for v to change from
secure to compromised state for the ith time
Rv the time it takes for v ∈ V to change from the
compromised state to the secure state
Rv,i the time it takes for v to change from
compromised to secure for the ith time
pv,c steady-state compromise probability metric
F
(1)
i,r , G
(1)
i,r distributions of X
(1)
i (r) and Y
(1)
i (r) w.r.t. r
F
(2)
i,θ , G
(2)
i,θ distributions of X
(2)
i (θ) and Y
(2)
i (θ) w.r.t. θ
2. THE NEW APPROACH AND MODEL
2.1 The Attack-Defense Structure Abstraction
This abstraction has been used, implicitly or explicitly, to de-
scribe attacks and defenses in the past years (see, for example, [6,
5, 15, 25, 30, 27, 28]). Specifically, computers in a cyber system
(e.g., an enterprise network and its associated information systems)
can be abstracted as nodes (i.e., vertices) in terms of graph-theoretic
models. We consider two major classes of cyber attacks:
• Push-based attacks: They are launched by malwares from
the compromised computers against the vulnerable ones, by
attempting to actively infect them.
• Pull-based attacks: These attacks are launched through mech-
anisms such as the drive-by-download attack (i.e., a vulnera-
ble computer gets compromised because the user accessed a
malicious website) and the insider attack that an authorized
user intentionally executes a malicious software program on
a computer. A computer compromised by a pull-based attack
can further launch push-based attacks.
These two classes of attacks have been investigated by [14, 30, 15,
27], but using different approaches (see Section 4). Push-based at-
tacks formulate an attack-structure, which is a graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of nodes (i.e., computers) and E represents
the direct attack relation that (u, v) ∈ E means u ∈ V can at-
tack v ∈ V directly (i.e., without using “stepping stones"). In
other words, the direct attack relation imposes a graph structure G,
which can have an arbitrary topology. For example, if a web server
cannot launch push-based attacks but can be abused to host/launch
pull-based attacks, the web server computer is not a node in V , but
is part of the abstract “global environment" — the source of pull-
based attacks. However, if the web server can also launch push-
based attacks, then it is a node in V and at the same time a part
of the abstract “global environment." At any point in time, a node
v ∈ V is either compromised, or secure (but vulnerable).
In parallel to the attack-structure, there exists a defense-structure
that represents how the defense takes place. In this paper we con-
sider the following popular classes of defense mechanisms (which
enforce security policies):
• Preventing known attacks: The defender uses (e.g.) network-
based and/or host-based firewall and Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS) to filter known attacks. We use a pair of parame-
ters, denoted by (c1, c2), to denote the capability for filtering
push-based and pull-based attacks that target at v ∈ V , re-
spectively.
• Detecting and curing successful attacks: The defender uses
(e.g.) anti-malware like mechanisms to detect malware in-
fections and clean up the compromised computers. We use
random variable Rv,i to represent the time to detect and cure
a compromised node v ∈ V for the ith time.
As a result, the aforementioned attack structure G = (V,E) nat-
urally becomes the attack-defense structure, which is extended to
accommodate the defense capabilities via parameters associated to
the nodes and/or edges.
Remark. The above abstraction is sufficient for the purpose of
the present paper (i.e., characterization study). It is an orthogo-
nal research problem to obtain actual attack-defense structures and
parameters for networked systems of interest.
2.2 The New Approach
We start with an illustration of attacks via Figure 1. Node v ∈ V
can be attacked by push-based attacks that are launched by v’s five
compromised (incoming) neighbors in the attack-defense structure
G = (V,E). Note that our model and results are equally applicable
to both directed and undirected attack-defense structures. Node
v ∈ V also can be attacked by pull-based attacks. The model has
two aspects: specifying when v is attacked (i.e., arrival of attacks),
and specifying when v is successfully attacked. This separation
Neighbor 1
Neighbor 4
Neighbor 2
Neighbor 3
Neighbor 5
Node v
Push-based 
attacks
Pull-based 
attacks
successful attack recoveryunsuccessful attack
Time t
compromised
secure
time interval when v is compromised time-to-compromise (v is secure)
Y·V state
Figure 1: Illustration of attacks against node
v and the evolution of v’s state: v’s local en-
vironment (random variable Jv) represents its
compromised neighbors 1, . . . , 5 that can launch
push-based attacks against v; the global envi-
ronment (random variable Θv) can launch pull-
based attacks against v (which are initiated by
v). A push- or pull-based attack against v may
or may not succeed. A successful attack changes
v’s state from secure to compromised, which can
be changed back to secure because of defense.
The time intervals during which node v is secure
or compromised can formulate an alternating re-
newal process. Our research task is to character-
ize the evolution of each v’s state via two security
metrics: time-to-compromise Tv,c and steady-
state compromise probability pv,c.
between arrival of attack and success of attack makes the resulting
model more “native" than previous models for the same purpose
[14, 30, 15, 27], meaning that the model is closer to real-life data
that contains both unsuccessful and successful attacks.
Specifying when a node is attacked (i.e., arrival of attack). We
model push-based attacks against node v via point process:{
(X
(1)
i (Jv), Y
(1)
i (Jv))
}
, i = 0, 1, 2 . . . ,
where random variable Jv represents the push-based local attack
environment — the random number of v’s compromised (incom-
ing) neighbors with support {0, . . . , deg(v)} and deg(v) being the
(in-)degree of v, random variable X(1)i (Jv) represents the mag-
nitude (i.e., sophistication or power) of the ith push-based attack
against v with X(1)0 (Jv) = 0, and random variable Y
(1)
i (Jv) rep-
resents the attack inter-arrival time between the (i − 1)th and the
ith push-based attacks against v with Y (1)0 (Jv) = 0.
Similarly, we model pull-based attacks via point process:{
(X
(2)
i (Θv), Y
(2)
i (Θv))
}
, i = 1, 2 . . . ,
where random variable Θv represents node v’s global pull-based at-
tack environment ( e.g., the extent of malicious websites presence
in cyberspace), random variable X(2)i (Θv) represents the magni-
tude (i.e., sophistication or power) of the ith pull-based attack against
v with X(2)i (Θv) = 0, and random variable Y
(2)
i (Θv) represents
the attack inter-arrival time between the (i− 1)th and the ith pull-
based attacks against v with Y (2)i (Θv) = 0.
Specifying when a node is compromised. Having specified when
an attack is launched against a secure node v, we now specify when
v becomes compromised. Let c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 abstract the
defense capabilities in filtering push-based and pull-based attacks,
respectively. A secure node v becomes compromised when the
magnitude of a push-based attack exceeds c1, or when the magni-
tude of a pull-based attack exceeds c2. The two defense capabilities
accommodate defenses, including network-based and host-based.
Specifying when a node recovers. Because of defense (e.g., mal-
ware or intrusion detection), a compromised node v becomes secure
after a random time Rv,i for the ith time.
Remark. Random variables X(1)i (Jv) for i = 1, 2, . . . accom-
modate the adaptiveness of push-based attack magnitudes against
node v because they depend on the same random variable (i.e., lo-
cal environment) Jv . Random variables Y (1)i (Jv) for i = 1, 2, . . .
accommodate the adaptiveness of push-based attack inter-arrival
times. For example, a greater Jv (in a stochastic sense) would
imply a severer local environment, namely more intense attacks
(i.e., smaller attack inter-arrival times) and/or greater attack mag-
nitudes (i.e., more powerful attacks). Similarly, random variables
X
(2)
i (Θv) for i = 1, 2, . . . accommodate the adaptiveness of pull-
based attacks (e.g., different exploits targeting at different vulnera-
bilities in the browser/computer) against v, because they depend on
the same random variable (i.e., global environment) Θv . Random
variables Y (2)i (Θv) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . accommodate the adaptive-
ness of inter-arrival times between pull-based attacks against v. We
will describe how the assumptions that we will make (for the sake
of analytic tractability) and the results accommodate adaptiveness.
2.3 Security Metrics
Metric 1: Time-to-compromise Tv,c where c = (c1, c2). As
illustrated in Figure 1, this metric, denoted by Tv,c, captures the
time it takes for node v to change from the secure state to the
compromised state. Since Tv,c is a random variable in general, we
consider its distribution qv,c(t) = P(Tv,c ≤ t). Specifically, for
given local environment Jv = r and global environment Θv = θ,
where 0 ≤ r ≤ deg(v) and θ > 0 (e.g., the portion of compro-
mised websites), let N (1)r (t) and N (2)θ (t) be the counting processes
associated to sequences {Y (1)i (r), i ≥ 0} and {Y
(2)
i (θ), i ≥ 0},
respectively. We respectively define the historical maximum (up to
time t) of the push- and pull-based attack magnitudes as
M (1)r (t) = ∨
N
(1)
r (t)
i=0 X
(1)
i (r), (1)
M
(2)
θ (t) = ∨
N
(2)
θ
(t)
i=0 X
(2)
i (θ),
where “∨" means taking the maximum. The time-to-compromise
for node v, due to push-based attacks launched from the given r
compromised neighbors and due to pull-based attacks from the
given global environment θ, can be respectively defined as
T (1)c1 (r) = inf{t : M
(1)
r (t) > c1}, (2)
T (2)c2 (θ) = inf{t : M
(2)
θ (t) > c2}.
Therefore, the time-to-compromise for node v is
Tc(r, θ) = T
(1)
c1 (r) ∧ T
(2)
c2 (θ), (3)
where “∧" means taking the minimum.
The above reasoning is for given c = (c1, c2) and (Jv = r,Θv =
θ). For random environments (Jv,Θv), we obtain the time-to-
compromise for node v as
Tv,c ≡ Tc(Jv,Θv) = T
(1)
c1 (Jv) ∧ T
(2)
c2 (Θv), (4)
which is the mixture of Tc(r, θ), with respect to Jv and Θv .
Note that the above discussion does not rely on any assumption,
and applies even if the system is not in the steady state. The dis-
cussion holds under the assumptions discussed below.
Metric 2: Steady-state compromise probability pv,c. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, the state of v ∈ V alternates with time. For
given defense capabilities c = (c1, c2), the state of v ∈ V at
time t can be seen as Bernoulli random variable Xv,c(t), where
Xv,c(t) = 1 means v is compromised and Xv,c(t) = 0 means v
is secure. Let pv,c(t) = P(Xv,c(t) = 1) be the probability that v
is compromised at time t. We aim to obtain the probability that v
is compromised in the steady state: pv,c = limt→∞ pv,c(t).
3. ANALYZING THE MODEL
Preliminaries. Our analysis is centered on the two security met-
rics, while using the following definition [3, 16].
DEFINITION 1. Let F¯ = 1 − F be the survival function of
distribution F . F , or the corresponding random variable Z, is
said to be:
(i) NBU (New Better Than Used): This property says F¯ (z1 +
z2) ≤ F¯ (z1)F¯ (z2) for z1, z2 ≥ 0, namely that the con-
ditional survival probability satisfies P(Z > z1 + z2|Z >
z1) ≤ P(Z > z2).
(ii) NBUE (New Better Than Used in Expectation): This prop-
erty says
∫
∞
z
F¯ (x) dx ≤ E[Z]F¯ (z) for z ≥ 0, namely
that the conditional expectation satisfies E[Z − z|Z > z] ≤
E[Z].
We will consider attack inter-arrival time that exhibits such mem-
ory properties. This goes beyond the common practice of assuming
that the attack inter-arrival time follows the exponential distribu-
tion, whose memoryless property warrants analytic tractability. We
consider NBU or NBUE attack inter-arrival time, which contains
the exponential, Weibull, Pareto and Gamma distributions as spe-
cial cases. Note that NBU implies NBUE, but not vice versa. As
we will elaborate later, the NBU/NBUE memory property accom-
modates a kind of adaptiveness or dependence that is different from
what is accommodated by the random environment technique.
3.1 Analyzing Time-to-Compromise Metric Tv,c
3.1.1 Distribution function qv,c(t)
For the sake of tractability, we propose to retain the adaptiveness
that can be accommodated by local environment Jv and global en-
vironment Θv , but assume independence between the relevant ran-
dom variables conditioned on given specific environments Jv = r
and Θv = θ. This is a popular method for coping with dependence
in probability and statistics.
ASSUMPTION 1. (a) For any v ∈ V and for given local en-
vironment Jv = r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ deg(v):
(i) {X(1)i (r), i ≥ 1} is an independent sequence;
(ii) {Y (1)i (r), i ≥ 1} is an independent sequence;
(iii) {X(1)i (r), i ≥ 1} and {Y (1)i (r), i ≥ 1} are indepen-
dent of each other.
(b) For any v ∈ V and for given global environment Θv = θ:
(i) {X(2)i (θ), i ≥ 1} is an independent sequence;
(ii) {Y (2)i (θ), i ≥ 1} is an independent sequence;
(iii) {X(2)i (θ), i ≥ 1} and {Y (2)i (θ), i ≥ 1} are indepen-
dent of each other.
(c) For any v ∈ V , for given local environment Jv = r, and for
given global environment Θv = θ: {(X(1)i (r), Y
(1
i (r), i ≥
1} and {(X(2)i (θ), Y
(2)
i (θ)), i ≥ 1} (i.e., push-based at-
tacks and pull-based attacks) are independent of each other.
For technical simplicity, we further assume that Jv and Θv
are independent of each other. These collectively imply the
following property: {(X(1)i (Jv), Y (1)i (Jv)), i ≥ 1} and
{(X
(2)
i (Θv), Y
(2)
i (Θv)), i ≥ 1} are independent of each
other.
How does Assumption 1 accommodate adaptiveness of attacks?
First, the above (a).(i) does not imply that the magnitudes of push-
based attacks {X(1)i (Jv), i ≥ 1}, under random environment Jv
(rather than a given Jv = r compromised neighbors), are indepen-
dent. In contrast, {X(1)i (Jv), i ≥ 1} are dependent because of the
following [21]: Suppose X(1)i (r) is increasing or decreasing (i.e.,
it is the monotonicity that matters) in r for any i ≥ 1 in the like-
lihood ratio order [20], which is not ruled out by the above (a).(i).
Then, fr+1(x)/fr(x) is increasing or decreasing, where fr+1(x)
and fr(x) are density functions of X(1)i (r + 1) and X
(1)
i (r), re-
spectively. For any s ≤ s′, we have
P
(
X
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≥ x|X
(1)
i (Jv) = s
)
≤ P
(
X
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≥ x|X
(1)
i (Jv) = s
′
)
.
This means that a larger magnitude s′ (i.e., a failed sophisticated
attack) is more likely followed by another (more) sophisticated at-
tack, namely that the attacker can adaptively increases its attack
power (until an attack succeeds). The fundamental reason for that
{X
(1)
i (r), i ≥ 1} for a given r is independent but {X
(1)
i (Jv), i ≥
1} is dependent is exactly that X(1)i (r) is increasing or decreasing
in r for any i ≥ 1.
Second, the independence between the attack inter-arrival times
in (a).(ii) is for given local environment Jv = r; whereas attack
inter-arrival times between push-based attacks Y (1)i (Jv) for i ≥ 1,
under random environment Jv , can be dependent. Suppose Y (1)i (r)
is decreasing (or increasing) in r for any i ≥ 1 in the likelihood
ratio order. It is also known [21] that for s ≤ s′
P
(
Y
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≤ y|Y
(1)
i (Jv) = s
)
≥ P
(
Y
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≤ y|Y
(1)
i (Jv) = s
′
)
,
This means that a smaller inter-arrival time s (i.e., a failed intense
attack) is more likely followed by another (more) intense attack,
namely that the attacker can adaptively reduce its attack time (until
an attack succeeds).
Third, the above (a).(iii) does not imply {X(1)i (Jv), i ≥ 1} and
{Y
(1)
i (Jv), i ≥ 1} are independent. Rather, they are dependent be-
cause both magnitudes and attack inter-arrival times are dependent
on the local environment Jv .
The preceding discussion focuses on Assumption 1.(a) and is
equally applicable to Assumption 1.(b).
When would (not) Assumption 1 hold? Assumption 1 can be
violated by full-fledged adaptive and coordinated attacks. This
means that our model accommodates a certain degree of adaptive-
ness. Nevertheless, Assumption 1(c) would often hold because
pull-based attacks are essentially governed by user behaviors (e.g.,
how often a user accesses malicious websites), while pull-based
attacks are not. Moreover, the software vulnerabilities that are ex-
ploited by pull-based attacks are often different from the software
vulnerabilities that are exploited by push-based attacks.
Characterizing distribution function qv,c(t) under Assumption
1. Denote by F (1)i,r (·) and F
(2)
i,θ (·) respectively the distribution func-
tions of X(1)i (r) and X
(2)
i (θ), by G
(1)
i,r (·) and G
(2)
i,θ (·) respectively
the distribution functions of Y (1)i (r) and Y
(2)
i (θ), where 0 ≤ r ≤
deg(v) and θ > 0. For fixed defense capabilities c1, c2 > 0, from
Eqs. (1) and (2) as well as Assumption 1(a) we have:
P
(
T (1)c1 (r) > t
)
= P
(
∨
N
(1)
r (t)
i=0 X
(1)
i (r) < c1
)
=
∞∑
m=0
[
P
(
∨
N
(1)
r (t)
i=0 X
(1)
i (r) < c1|N
(1)
r (t) = m
)
·
P
(
N (1)r (t) = m
)]
=
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,r (c1)P
(
N (1)r (t) = m
)
. (5)
Similarly, from Assumption 1(b) we can obtain
P
(
T (2)c2 (θ) > t
)
=
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(2)
i,θ (c2)P
(
N
(2)
θ (t) = m
)
, (6)
where we define
∏0
i=1 ai = 1 for any ai. From Eq. (3) and As-
sumption 1(c), we have
P(Tc(r, θ) > t) = P
(
T (1)c2 (r) > t, T
(2)
c2 (θ) > t
)
=
[
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,r (c2)P
(
N (1)r (t) = m
)]
·
[
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(2)
i,θ (c2)P
(
N
(2)
θ (t) = m
)]
.
Let πv,r be the probability mass function of Jv and Hv(·) be the
distribution function of Θv . Since Tv,c is the mixture of Tc(r, θ)
with respect to Jv and Θv, we have
qv,c(t)
= P(Tv,c ≤ t)
= 1− E [E [I(Tv,c > t)|Jv,Θv]]
= 1− E
[
E
[
I
(
T (1)c1 (Jv) > t, T
(2)
c2 (Θv) > t
)
|Jv,Θv
]]
= 1− E
[
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,Jv
(c1)P
(
N
(1)
Jv
(t) = m
)]
·
E
[
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(2)
i,Θv
(c2)P
(
N
(2)
Θv
(t) = m
)]
= 1−
d(v)∑
r=0
πv,r
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,r (c1)P
(
N (1)r (t) = m
)
·
∫
∞
0
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(2)
i,θ (c2)P
(
N
(2)
θ (t) = m
)
dHv(θ). (7)
3.1.2 An upper bound for qv,c(t): qv,c(t)+
Since we cannot attain simple closed-form expression of qv,c(t)
as shown in Eq. (7), we aim to bound it by making the following
Assumption 2.
ASSUMPTION 2. (a) The same as Assumption 1(a).
(b) The same as Assumption 1(b).
(c) For any v ∈ V and given environments Jv = r and Θv = θ,{(
X
(1)
i (r), Y
(1)
i (r)
)
, i ≥ 1
}
are independently and iden-
tically distributed samples of
{
(X(1)(r), Y (1)(r))
}
, and{(
X
(2)
i (θ), Y
(2)
i (θ)
)
, i ≥ 1
}
are independently and iden-
tically distributed samples of
{
(X(2)(θ), Y (2)(θ))
}
.
Now we present an upper bound for qv,c(t), denoted by q+v,c(t).
Denote by F (1)r (t), G(1)r (t), F (2)θ (t) and G
(2)
θ (t) the distributions
of X(1)(r), Y (1)(r), X(2)(θ) and Y (2)(θ), respectively. Under
Assumption 2, from Eq. (7), we have
qv,c(t) = 1−E
[
(F
(1)
Jv
(c1))
N
(1)
Jv
(t)
]
E
[
(F
(2)
Θv
(c2))
N
(2)
Θv
(t)
]
. (8)
PROPOSITION 1. (upper bound of qv,c(t)) Suppose Assump-
tion 2 holds, and Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ) have the NBU property
for any given local environment Jv = r and global environment
Θv = θ. We have
q+v,c(t)
= 1−
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,r[G¯
(1)
r (t)]
F¯
(1)
r (c1)
∫
∞
0
[G¯
(2)
θ (t)]
F¯
(2)
θ
(c2) dHv(θ).
How does Proposition 1 (i.e., Assumption 2 and NBU attack
inter-arrival times) accommodate adaptiveness of attacks? On
one hand, Assumption 2 is slightly stronger than Assumption 1,
meaning that the adaptiveness accommodated by Assumption 2
may be slightly weaker than the adaptiveness accommodated by
Assumption 1. On the other hand, under Assumption 2, {Y (1)i (r), i ≥
1} are independently and identically distributed according to distri-
bution Y (1)(r), whose NBU property brings a certain other kind of
adaptiveness that is not accommodated by Assumption 1. Specifi-
cally, the NBU property says
P
(
Y (1)(r) > z1 + z2|Y
(1)(r) > z1
)
≤ P
(
Y (1)(r) > z2
)
.
By treating the attack events as a stationary point process with at-
tack inter-arrival times that exhibit the NBU property, we see that
for any z1, z2 ≥ 0,
P
(
Y
(1)
i+1(r) > z1 + z2|Y
(1)
i+1(r) > z1
)
≤ P
(
Y
(1)
i (r) > z2
)
.
That is, the extra-waiting time for the (i + 1)th attack under the
condition that the attack has not arrived after some time is smaller
than the waiting time for the ith attack in the stochastic sense. It
is worthwhile to highlight that the adaptiveness accommodated by
Assumption 1 is caused by that Y (1)i (r) is decreasing or increas-
ing in r in the likelihood ratio order; whereas, the adaptiveness
accommodated by NBU is caused by the “memory" property of the
distribution of Y (1)(r) for fixed r.
3.1.3 Expectation function E[Tv,c] and its lower bound
We present two lower bounds based on different assumptions.
One lower bound E[Tv,c]− under Assumption 2 and NBUE at-
tack inter-arrival times. From (7), it can be shown that
E[Tv,c] =
∫
∞
0
(1− qv,c(t))dt
= E
[
∞∑
ℓ=0
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,Jv
(c1)
m∏
j=1
F
(2)
j,Θv
(c2)
∫
∞
0
p
(
N
(1)
Jv
(t) = ℓ
)
P
(
N
(2)
Θv
(t) = m
)
dt
]
.
Since we cannot derive simple closed-form expression for E[Tv,c],
we derive a lower bound of E[Tv,c], denoted by E[Tv,c]−, by con-
sidering the two classes of attacks separately.
From Eqs. (5) and (6) we have
E[T (1)c1 (r)] =
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,r (c1)
∫
∞
0
P(N (1)r (t) = m) dt
=
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(1)
i,r (c1)E[Y
(1)
m+1(r)], (9)
and
E[T (2)c2 (θ)] =
∞∑
m=0
m∏
i=1
F
(2)
i,θ (c2)E[Y
(2)
m+1(θ)]. (10)
Under Assumption 2, the two expectations in Eqs. (9) and (10) can
be expressed as
E[T (1)c1 (r)] =
E[Y (1)(r)]
F¯ (1)r (c1)
, E[T (2)c2 (θ)] =
E[Y (2)(θ)]
F¯
(2)
θ (c2)
. (11)
PROPOSITION 2. (lower bound E[Tv,c]−) Suppose Assumption
2 holds, and Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ) have the NBUE property for any
given local environment Jv = r and global environment Θv = θ.
We have
E[Tv,c]
−
=
deg(v)∑
r=0
∫
∞
0
πv,r
(
F¯ (1)r (c1)
E[Y (1)(r)]
+
F¯
(2)
θ (c2)
E[Y (2)(θ)]
)
−1
dHv(θ).
How does Proposition 2 (i.e., Assumption 2 and NBUE attack
inter-arrival times) accommodate adaptiveness of attacks? As
mentioned above, the adaptiveness accommodated by Assumption
2 may be slightly weaker than the adaptiveness accommodated by
Assumption 1. On the other hand, under Assumption 2, the NBUE
property brings a certain other degree of adaptiveness. Specifically,
the NBUE property says
E
[
Y (1)(r)− z|Y (1)(r) > z
]
≤ E
[
Y (1)(r)
]
.
Similarly, by treating the attack events as a stationary point pro-
cess with all attack inter-arrival times having a common marginal
distribution, the NBUE property implies that for any z ≥ 0,
E[Y
(1)
i+1(r)− z|Y
(1)
i+1(r) > z] ≤ E[Y
(1)
i (r)] for i ≥ 1.
That is, the expected waiting time for the ith attack is greater than
the expected extra-waiting time under the condition that the (i +
1)th attack has not arrived within time z. It is also worth mention-
ing that the adaptiveness accommodated by Assumption 1 is caused
by that Y (1)i (r) is decreasing or increasing in r in the likelihood
ratio order; whereas, the adaptiveness accommodated by NBUE is
caused by the “memory" property of the distribution of Y (1)(r).
Another lower bound E[Tv,c]− under Assumption 3 and NBUE
attack inter-arrival times. The lower bound given in Proposition
2 is useful because it only requires information about the expecta-
tions of the attack inter-arrival time (rather than the entire distribu-
tion). In what follows, we establish another lower bound under a
different assumption.
ASSUMPTION 3. This assumption is the same as Assumption
1, except that Assumption 1(a).(i) and 1(b).(i) are respectively re-
placed by the following:
(a).(i) For any given local environment Jv = r, {X(1)i (r), i ≥ 1}
is an independent and increasing sequence (in i) in the usual
stochastic order sense.
(b).(i) For any global environment Θv = θ, and {X(2)i (θ), i ≥ 1}
is an independent and increasing sequence (in i) in the usual
stochastic order sense.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Suppose Y (1)i (r)
and Y (2)i (θ) have the NBUE property for any given local environ-
ment Jv = r and global environment Θv = θ. Suppose E[Y (1)i (r)]
and E[Y (2)i (θ)] are decreasing in i for i ≥ 1. We have
E[Tv,c]
−
=
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,r
∫
∞
0
(E−1[T (1)c1 (r)] + E
−1[T (2)c2 (θ)])
−1 dHv(θ),
where E[T (1)c1 (r)] and E[T
(2)
c2 (θ)] are respectively given in Eqs. (9)
and (10).
How does Proposition 3 accommodate adaptiveness of attacks?
First, Assumption 3 is slightly stronger than Assumption 1, mean-
ing that the adaptiveness accommodated by Assumption 3 may be
slightly weaker than the adaptiveness that is accommodated by As-
sumption 1. Second, the enhanced Assumption 3(a).(i) and 3(b).(i)
accommodate a certain other kind of adaptiveness, namely
P
(
X
(1)
i+1(r) > s
)
≥ P
(
X
(1)
i (r) > s
)
, and
P
(
X
(1)
i+1(θ) > s
)
≥ P
(
X
(1)
i (θ) > s
)
,
which accommodate increasing magnitudes (or capabilities) of at-
tacks. Third, the assumption that E[Y (1)i (r)] and E[Y
(2)
i (θ)] are
decreasing in i for i ≥ 1 further accommodates the following adap-
tiveness in attacks inter-arrive times:
E
[
Y
(1)
i+1(r)
]
≤ E
[
Y
(1)
i (r)
]
and E
[
Y
(1)
i+1(θ)
]
≤ E
[
Y
(1)
i (θ)
]
,
namely that attacks can get more intense.
3.1.4 Example: Numerical solution to qv,c(t) and tightness
of upper bound q+v,c(t) and lower bound E[Tv,c]−
On the tightness of upper bound q+v,c(t). Consider a random
node v ∈ V . Suppose X(1)(r), the random magnitude of any
push-based attack launched from the local environment Jv = r
compromised neighbors, is Weibull random variable with shape
parameter α, scale parameter 1/r, and distribution function
F (1)r (t) = 1− e
−(r−1t)α , α > 0, t > 0.
Suppose Y (1)(r), the inter-arrival time between any two consec-
utive push-based attacks, is Gamma random variable with shape
parameter β ≥ 1, scale parameter r, and distribution function
G(1)r (t) =
∫ t
0
rβxβ−1e−rx
Γ(β)
dx, β ≥ 1, t > 0.
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c=2
c=3.5
c=5
c=6
t
q v
,
c(t
) &
 
q v
,
c
+
(t)
(c) deg(v) = 8, p = 0.5
Figure 2: qv,c(t) and
q+v,c(t) with parameters
α = 2, β = 2, γ = 1,
λ = 2.5, a = 1, b = 2
and c = c1 = c2. In
Figure 2(c), dashed curves
correspond to the analytic
upper bounds q+v,c(t) and
solid curves correspond to
qv,c(t) obtained numeri-
cally.
Note that if β = 1, the attack inter-arrival time becomes the ex-
ponential distribution, which is often assumed in many previous
security models and justifies why our model is general. Suppose
Jv follows the Binomial distribution with parameter p. The proba-
bility that v has r compromised neighbors is:
πv,r =
(
deg(v)
r
)
pr(1− p)(deg(v)−r), r = 0, . . . ,deg(v).
Given Θv = θ, suppose the magnitude X(2)(θ) of any pull-based
attack is Weibull random variable with shape parameter γ, scale
parameter 1/θ, and distribution function
F
(2)
θ (t) = 1− e
−(θ−1t)γ , γ > 0, t > 0.
Suppose the inter-arrival time Y (2)(θ) between any two consecu-
tive pull-based attacks is Gamma random variable with shape pa-
rameter λ ≥ 1, scale parameter θ, and distribution function
G
(2)
θ (t) =
∫ t
0
θλxλ−1e−θx
Γ(λ)
dx, λ ≥ 1, t > 0.
Suppose environment Θv is uniformly distributed in [a, b] (i.e.,
pull-based attacks are from a uniform environment), namely
Hv(θ) =
θ − a
b− a
, a ≤ θ ≤ b, 0 ≤ a < b.
Note that for all r and θ, Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ) have the NBU prop-
erty because their shape parameters β ≥ 1 and λ ≥ 1.
Figure 2 demonstrates how the parameters affect the qv,c(t) as
specified in Eq. (8), where c = c1 = c2. Figure 2(a) shows how
the local environment affects qv,c(t), where a greater p means a
severer environment (i.e., more compromised neighbors) and leads
to a greater qv,c(t) or a smaller time-to-compromise. Figure 2(b)
shows that the greater the node degree, the greater qv,c(t) or the
smaller the time-to-compromise. Figure 2(c) plots the upper bound
q+v,c(t) (dashed curves) derived from Proposition 1 and the proba-
bility qv,c(t) obtained numerically according to Eq. (8). We ob-
serve that q+v,c(t) is tight for small c = c1 = c2, meaning that
q+v,c(t) is particularly useful in the scenario of less effectively de-
fended networked systems (e.g., c = c1 = c2 ≤ 2); precisely
mapping c1 and c2 to actual attacks can be based on cyber attack-
defense experiments, which are orthogonal to the focus of the present
paper. We also observe that a greater c leads to a smaller qv,c(t)
and a greater time-to-compromise Tv,c (because a better defended
networked system is relatively harder to penetrate into).
On the tightness of lower bound E[Tv,c]−. Figure 3 demonstrates
the tightness of lower bound of E[Tv,c]− as derived from Proposi-
tion 2. Figure 3(a) shows that E[Tv,c]− is tight for p = .2 or
relatively secure environment. Figure 3(b) shows that E[Tv,c]−
is tight for p = .8 or relatively more malicious environment. As
such, E[Tv,c]− could be used in place of E[Tv,c] for decision-
making, which is useful because E[Tv,c]− is easier to obtain (i.e.,
requires little information). It is also observed that both E[Tv,c] and
E[Tv,c]
− increase in c = c1 = c2, since better defense (i.e., larger
c) leads to greater time-to-compromise time. This further suggests
that although it is hard to precisely compute security metrics for
the case of less effectively defended networked systems (i.e., small
c1 and c2), the defender could use the easier-to-obtain bounds for
decision-making purpose.
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T v,
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E[
T v
,
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E[Tv,c]
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c
(b) p = 0.8
Figure 3: Tightness of E[Tv,c]−: c = c1 = c2, α = 2, β = 2,
γ = 1, λ = 2.5, a = 1, b = 2, deg(v) = 8 and p = .2, .8. Since
the easier-to-obtain lower bound is tight, the defender can use
it in decision making.
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, both q+v,c(t) and E[Tv,c]− are tight
when c = c1 = c2 is small (e.g., c = 2). This is no coincident, and
can be explained by the following fact:
E[Tv,c] =
∫
∞
0
(1− qv,c(t)) dt ≥
∫
∞
0
(
1− q+v,c(t)
)
dt
≥ E[Tv,c]
−,
where the last inequality can be obtained from the proof of Propo-
sition 2 (in the Appendix).
3.2 Asymptotic Results on qv,c(t) with Highly
Effective Defense
Since the distribution function qv,c(t) of random variable Tv,c
is hard to characterize in general, we want to know if there are any
special cases where we can characterize qv,c(t). In this Section, we
present such a result for the special case of highly effective defense,
which is abstracted as c1, c2 →∞.
3.2.1 Asymptotic results on qv,c(t) when c1, c2 →∞
Suppose the means of attack inter-arrival times Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ),
respectively denoted by µr and νθ , are finite.
PROPOSITION 4. (asymptotic expression of qv,c(t)when c1, c2 →
∞) Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Suppose µr and νθ are finite. As
c1, c2 →∞, we have
qv,c(t) ∼ q˜v,c(t) :=
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,r(1− e
−F¯
(1)
r (c1)t/µr ) +
∫
∞
0
[
1− e−F¯
(2)
θ
(c2)t/νθ
]
dHv(θ).
The asymptotic result q˜v,c given in Proposition 4 is useful be-
cause it allows to compute qv,c(t) while demanding much less in-
formation (i.e., the means of attack inter-arrival times µr and νθ)
than to compute qv,c(t) according to Eq. (8), which demands in-
formation about the distributions of the inter-arrival times between
push-based attacks as well as the inter-arrivals times between pull-
based attacks. The following numerical example confirms that the
asymptotic q˜v,c converges to qv,c as c1, c2 →∞.
3.2.2 Example
We continue the above example by using the same distributions
of X(1)(r) and X(2)(θ). However, instead of assuming that the at-
tack inter-arrival times Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ) follow the Gamma dis-
tribution, we assume that we only know their means µr = r−1Γ(1+
β)/Γ(β) and νθ = θ−1Γ(1 + λ)/Γ(λ). Figure 4 plots the asymp-
totic q˜v,c and qv,c for different c = c1 = c2. We observe that as
c increases, q˜v,c converges to qv,c. Actually, q˜v,c is already fairly
close to qv,c for c = 8 or even c = 5. This indicates that we can use
the asymptotic q˜v,c, instead of qv,c(t), for decision-making pur-
pose when c1 and c2 are large. This is valuable because the former
requires much less information to compute than the latter.
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Figure 4: q˜v,c(t) (dashed curves) vs qv,c(t) (solid curves): c =
c1 = c2, α = 2, λ = 2.5, a = 1, b = 2, deg(v) = 8, and p = .5.
We observe that the asymptotic q˜v,c(t) can be used to replace
qv,c(t) for c ≥ 12 or even c ≥ 8; this is valuable because the
former demands much less information.
3.3 Analyzing Steady-State Compromise Prob-
ability pv,c
Now we analyze pv,c, the probability that v ∈ V is compromised
in the steady state. Specifically, let Tv,c,i be the length of time
interval it takes for v to become the compromised state from the
secure state for the ith time (i.e., the length of time interval it takes
for the ith compromise), Rv,i be the length of time interval it takes
for v to become the secure state from the compromised state for
the ith time (i.e., the length of time interval it takes for the ith
recovery), Jv,i be the random number of compromised neighbors
of node v after the (i − 1)th recovery, where i = 1, 2, . . .. Un-
der the condition that each compromise-and-recovery cycle has the
same distribution after each recovery (i.e., reset to the secure state),
Jv,i for i = 1, 2, . . . are independently and identically distributed.
Therefore, the stochastic process can be seen as an alternating re-
newal process with a sequence of vectors (Tv,c,i, Rv,i) for i ≥ 1,
which have the same distributions as (Tv,c, Rv).
3.3.1 Analyzing pv,c with respect to arbitrary attack-defense
graph structure G
How to compute pv,c numerically? Recall the attack-defense
structure G = (V,E) with |V | = n and adjacency matrix A =
(auv)n×n, where auv = 1 if and only if (u, v) ∈ E, and auv = 0
otherwise. Recall also that each v ∈ V has an associated alterna-
tive renewal process with i.i.d. time intervals (Tv,c,i, Rv,i), where
Tv,c,i and Rv,i respectively follow distributions Tv,c and Rv . The
probability that v is compromised in the steady state is [19]:
pv,c =
E[Rv ]
E[Rv ] + E[Tv,c]
, where
E[Tv,c] =
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
Jv
(c1))
N
(1)
Jv
(t)
]
E
[
(F
(2)
Θv
(c2))
N
(2)
Θv
(t)
]
dt.
In the steady state, the number of compromised neighbors of v is
Jv =
n∑
u=1
auvXu,
where pu,c = P(Xu = 1). Thus, we need to solve the following
system of equations to get pv,c:
pv,c
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
∑
n
u=1 auvXu
(c1))
N
(1)
∑n
u=1
auvXu
(t)
]
·
E
[
(F
(2)
Θv
(c2))
N
(2)
Θv
(t)
]
dt− (1− pv,c)E[Rv ] = 0, v ∈ V.
This system of equations cannot be handled analytically because
we are unable to determinate the joint distributions of (X1, . . . , Xn).
Therefore, we resort to the mean-field approximation by replac-
ing random variables Jv and Θv with their respective expectations
E[Jv ] and E[Θv ]. Since E[Jv ] =
∑n
u=1 auvpu,c, we have
E[Tv,c] =
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
∑
n
u=1 auvpu,c
(c1))
N
(1)
∑n
u=1
auvpu,c
(t)
]
·
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯v
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯v
(t)
]
dt, (12)
where θ¯v = E[Θv]. We then obtain the following system of equa-
tions with respect to pu,c for all v ∈ V :
pv,c
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
∑
n
u=1 auvpu,c
(c1))
N
(1)
∑n
u=1
auvpu,c
(t)
]
·
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯v
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯v
(t)
]
dt− (1− pv,c)E[Rv ] = 0. (13)
By solving the above system of equations for all v ∈ V , we ob-
tain the vector of steady-state compromise probability (pv,c)v∈V ,
which can be used for decision-making purpose.
How to bound pv,c under a certain assumption? Since it is diffi-
cult to get closed-form solution of pv,c, we propose to bound pv,c
by using the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 4. Suppose the following monotonicity holds:
(a) X(1)(r) is increasing in r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ deg(v), in the
usual stochastic sense, meaning that a greater number of
compromised neighbors implies greater magnitude of push-
based attacks. X(2)(θ) is increasing in θ, where θ > 0, in
the stochastic order sense, meaning that severer environment
implies greater magnitude of pull-based attacks.
(b) Y (1)(r) is decreasing in r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ deg(v), in the
usual stochastic order sense, meaning that a greater num-
ber of compromised neighbors implies more frequent push-
based attacks, and Y (2)(θ) is decreasing in θ, where θ > 0,
in the stochastic sense, meaning that severer environment im-
plies more frequent pull-based attacks.
PROPOSITION 5. (bounds of pv,c) Suppose Assumptions 2 and
4 hold. We have for all v ∈ V(
1 +
E[Y (2)(θ¯v)]
F¯
(2)
θ¯v
(c2)E[Rv ]
)
−1
≤ pv,c ≤
(
1 + (E[Rv ])
−1 ·
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
deg(v)(c1))
N
(1)
deg(v)
(t)
]
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯v
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯v
(t)
]
dt
)
−1
.
Moreover, if Y (1)(deg(v)) and Y (2)(θ¯v) are NBUE for all v ∈ V ,
the following holds for all v ∈ V :
pv,c ≤

1 +
(
F¯
(1)
deg(v)(c1)E[Rv ]
E[Y (1)(deg(v))]
+
F¯
(2)
θ¯
(c2)E[Rv ]
E[Y (2)(θ¯)]
)−1
−1
.
The bounds given by Proposition 5 are useful because they do
not require to solve the system of equations given by Eq. (13).
How does Proposition 5 (Assumptions 2 and 4) accommodate
adaptiveness of attacks? Note that Assumption 2 is for fixed
Jv = r and Θv = θ, while Assumption 4 is for varying r in
the usual stochastic order sense. We here use the usual stochas-
tic order rather than the likelihood ratio order because the latter
is a overkill for proving Proposition 5. The adaptiveness accom-
modated by Proposition 5 is the adaptiveness that is collectively
accommodated by Assumptions 2 and 4, namely the adaptiveness
obtained by replacing the likelihood ratio order, which was used as
an example when we discuss the adaptiveness accommodated by
Assumption 1, with the usual stochastic order. More specifically,
since X(1)i (r) is increasing in r for any i ≥ 1 in the usual stochastic
order, for any s, s′ ≥ 0 we have [21]
P(X
(1)
i+1(Jv) > s
′|X
(1)
i (Jv) > s) ≥ P(X
(1)
i+1(Jv) > s
′),
meaning that a large magnitude s (e.g., a failed sophisticated at-
tack) is more likely followed by another (more) sophisticated attack
(when s′ > s). On the other hand, since Y (1)i (r) is increasing in r,
for any s, s′ ≥ 0 we have [21]
P(Y
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≤ s
′|Y
(1)
i (Jv) ≤ s) ≥ P(Y
(1)
i+1(Jv) ≤ s
′),
meaning that a short attack inter-arrival time (e.g., before launching
a failed attack) is more likely followed by another short (or even
shorter when s′ < s) attack inter-arrival time (i.e., the attack can
get more intense).
Remark. It is worth mentioning that the adaptiveness of attack
magnitudes and attack inter-arrival times that is accommodated by
Assumption 4 appears within each compromise-and-recovery cycle
of the renewal process, rather than inter-cycle adaptiveness (which
is not accommodated by the model of the present paper — its treat-
ment is left for future research.)
3.3.2 Example: pv,c with respect to regular attack-defense
graph structure G
As in the examples described above, we set c = c1 = c2 and
assume that the magnitudes of push- and pull-based attacks are
Weibull random variables with parameters (α, 1/r) and (γ, 1/θ),
and the attack inter-arrival times of push- and pull-based attacks
are Gamma random variables respectively with parameters (β, r)
and (λ, θ), where β, λ > 1, r is the number of v’s compromised
neighbors, and θ is the pull-based attack environment.
For regular attack-defense graph structures with deg(v) = k
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, we assume that for all v ∈ V , θ¯v =
θ¯, E[Rv ] = E[R]. Then, pv,c is the same for all v ∈ V. Let
pk,c be the steady-state compromise probability of any v. We have∑n
u=1 auvpu,c = kpk,c. Hence, Eq. (13) becomes
pk,c
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
kpk,c
(c1))
N
(1)
kpk,c
(t)
]
·
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯
(t)
]
dt− (1− pk,c)E[R] = 0,
Thus, the lower bound established in Proposition 5 can be expressed
as
p−k,c =
(
1 +
λ
e−(θ¯−1c)γ θ¯E[R]
)
−1
.
By noting that Y (1)(r) and Y (2)(θ) are NBUE, the upper bound is
p+k,c =
(
1 +
(
e−(k
−1c)αkE[R]
β
+
e−(θ¯
−1c)γ θ¯E[R]
λ
)
−1)−1
.
In Table 1, we compute the steady-state compromise probability
pk,c and its bounds p−k,c, p
+
k,c with different parameters as dis-
cussed above. We observe that for fixed k, the upper bound p+k,c
is tighter when c1 and c2 are small (i.e., the networked system is
less effectively defended) and the lower bound p−k,c is tighter when
c1 and c2 are large (i.e., the networked system is more effectively
defended). We also observe that for fixed c1 and c2, the upper
bound is tighter when k is large.
4. RELATED WORK
We classify related prior studies based on their relevance to the
goals and means of the present paper. On one hand, a promising
approach to modeling and analyzing security of networked systems
is centered on modeling the cyber epidemic phenomenon (see, for
example, [11, 6, 5, 25, 31, 26, 28]). These studies focused on
modeling push-based attacks. In order to accommodate drive-by-
download attacks, the concept of pull-based attacks was studied in
[14, 30, 27]. Our goal is to model security of networked systems
while offering a unique feature that distinguishes our model from
the ones presented in the literature. Specifically, our model can de-
scribe the dynamic dependence between the relevant random vari-
ables, due to the random environment technique we use. The issue
of accommodating dependence was first addressed in [26] via the
Copulas method, which however can accommodate static depen-
dence only. It is also worth mentioning that our model can describe
attack sophistication and defense capability. This explicitly distinc-
tion has been used in [18, 7] for describing attacks against a single
assest (e.g., node or computer), and in [29] for describing active
attack-defense interactions in networked systems.
Our approach to modeling and analyzing security was inspired
by the random environment and shock model techniques in the The-
ory of Reliability. The random environment technique has been
c
k = 5 k = 8 k = 10 k = 12
pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c
2.0 .90 .87 .92 .92 .87 .94 .93 .87 .95 .94 .87 .95
2.5 .89 .85 .91 .92 .85 .93 .93 .85 .94 .94 .85 .95
3.0 .88 .83 .90 .91 .83 .93 .93 .83 .94 .94 .83 .95
3.5 .86 .82 .89 .90 .81 .92 .92 .82 .94 .93 .82 .94
4.0 .84 .80 .87 .90 .80 .92 .92 .80 .93 .93 .80 .94
5.0 .79 .75 .84 .88 .75 .90 .91 .75 .92 .92 .75 .94
6.0 .72 .70 .79 .84 .70 .88 .89 .70 .91 .91 .70 .93
7.0 .65 .65 .73 .79 .65 .86 .87 .65 .90 .90 .65 .92
8.0 .59 .59 .65 .67 .59 .83 .83 .59 .88 .89 .59 .91
9.0 .53 .53 .57 .54 .53 .79 .75 .52 .86 .87 .53 .90
c
k = 15 k = 20 k = 25 k = 30
pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c pk,c p
−
k,c p
+
k,c
2.0 .95 .87 .96 .96 .87 .97 .97 .87 .97 .97 .87 .98
2.5 .95 .85 .96 .96 .85 .97 .97 .85 .97 .97 .85 .98
3.0 .95 .83 .96 .96 .83 .96 .97 .83 .97 .97 .83 .97
3.5 .95 .82 .95 .96 .81 .96 .97 .82 .97 .97 .82 .97
4.0 .94 .80 .95 .96 .80 .96 .97 .80 .97 .97 .80 .97
5.0 .94 .75 .95 .96 .75 .96 .97 .75 .97 .97 .75 .97
6.0 .94 .70 .94 .95 .70 .96 .96 .70 .97 .97 .70 .97
7.0 .93 .65 .94 .95 .65 .96 .96 .65 .97 .97 .65 .97
8.0 .92 .59 .93 .95 .59 .95 .96 .59 .96 .97 .59 .97
9.0 .92 .53 .93 .95 .53 .95 .96 .52 .96 .97 .53 .97
Table 1: Steady-state compromise
probability pk,c vs. its bounds p−k,c,
p+k,c with parameters c = c1 = c2,
α = 2, β = 3.5, γ = 1, λ = 1.5,
θ¯ = 4, E[Rv ] = 4: We observe
that for fixed k, the upper bound
is tighter when c = c1 = c2 is
small and the lower bound is tighter
when c is large, and for fixed c, the
upper bound is tighter when k is
large. These indicate the parame-
ter regimes where the lower or up-
per bound can be used for decision-
making purpose.
used to describe the external environment that has an impact on
the performance of systems and for explaining the dependence be-
tween systems that operate in the same environment (see, for exam-
ple, [23, 16]). (Note that the notion of random environment used
in the present paper is different from the same term that is however
used in a different context [32].) The shock model technique [2, 9,
8, 22, 24, 13, 12] was originally used to describe the phenomenon
that systems (or components) may or may not fail under “shocks"
of different magnitude. Our model goes beyond the two techniques
as used in the Theory of Reliability because of the following. First,
we use local random environment to model push-based attacks and
global random environment to model pull-based attacks. Second,
we allow push-based and pull-based attacks to be against different
thresholds, which extend the standard shock model (with only one
threshold) and lead to useful analytic results.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that our goal and approach
are different from the goal and approach of attack graph, which
was initiated by [17, 10, 1] and followed by many others. Attack
graph studies assume that the system vulnerabilities are known. In
contrast, we do not assume that the vulnerabilities are known (e.g.,
all known vulnerabilities may have been patched).
5. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
First, we represent random environments Jv and Θv as random
variables. A more general and powerful representation is that they
are driven by stochastic processes. Similarly, we represent the re-
covery time Rv,i as random variable, and it would be better to rep-
resent as driven by some stochastic process.
Second, a node can only be compromised by one attack at a time.
In practice, a computer can be compromised by multiple attacks
during a period of time. While our model can be seen as an ap-
proximation to the reality — by considering the aggregate effect of
attacks such that a computer is secure only when it is not compro-
mised by any attack, it is interesting to explicitly consider the case
that a computer can be compromised by multiple attacks. For this
purpose, we may take advantage of the recent model [31], which
uses a different approach to accommodate that a node can be com-
promised by multiple attacks.
Third, we represent the defense thresholds, c1 against push-based
attacks and c2 against pull-based attacks, as some deterministic val-
ues. A more general and powerful representation is that they are
represented by random variables or even driven by some stochastic
processes. Moreover, the success of attacks can be probabilistic, as
in [29], rather than deterministic.
6. CONCLUSION
We have presented a stochastic model for analyzing security of
networked systems. The model uses random environment to ac-
commodate a certain degree of adaptiveness of attacks, while using
magnitude and threshold to respectively abstract the attack and de-
fense capabilities. The model leads to two natural security metrics,
which guide our analysis of the model. We discussed the limita-
tions of the model, which need to be addressed by future research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since N˜ (1)r (t) is a non-homogeneous Pois-
son process with rate Qr(t) = − log G¯(1)r (t), we have
P(N˜ (1)r (t) ≥ m) =
∞∑
j=m
[Qr(t)]
j
j!
e−Qr(t), m ≥ 0.
Since Y (1)(r) has NBU distribution, from Theorem 3.2 of [3] (p.162)
it follows that
P(N (1)r (t) ≥ m) ≤ P(N
(1)
r (t) ≥ m)
for all m ≥ 0, which immediately implies that
E
[
(F (1)r (c1))
N
(1)
r (t)
]
≥ E
[
(F (1)r (c1))
N˜
(1)
r (t)
]
because sx is decreasing in x > 0 for 0 < s < 1. Then,
E
[
(F (1)r (c1))
N˜
(1)
r (t)
]
= e−F¯
(1)
r (c1)Qr(t) =
[
G¯(1)r (t)
]F¯ (1)r (c1)
is the probability generating function of N˜ (1)r (t) at F (1)r (c1). Thus,
we have
E
[
(F
(1)
Jv
(c1))
N
(1)
Jv
(t)
]
≥ E
[
(G¯
(1)
Jv
(t))F¯
(1)
Jv
(c1)
]
.
For the pull-based attacks, we can similarly have
E
[
(F
(2)
Θv
(c2))
N
(2)
Θv
(t)
]
≥ E
[
(G¯
(2)
Θv
(t))F¯
(2)
Θv
(c2)
]
.
By combing the last two inequalities with Eq. (8), the proposition
follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is easy to check that both
(
F
(1)
r (c1)
)m
and
(
F
(2)
θ (c2)
)m
in Eqs. (8) are discrete NBUE. By Theorem 2.3
in [4] and the NBUE property of Y (1)r and Y (2)θ , we conclude that
both T (1)c1 (r) and T
(2)
c2 (θ) are NBUE. By using Eq. (4), it can be
shown
E[Tc(r, θ)] = E
[
T (1)c1 (r) ∧ T
(2)
c2 (θ)
]
=
∫
∞
0
P
(
T (1)c1 (r) ∧ T
(2)
c2 (θ) > t
)
dt
=
∫
∞
0
P
(
T (1)c1 (r) > t
)
P
(
T (2)c2 (θ) > t
)
dt
≥ (E−1[T (1)c1 (r)] + E
−1[T (2)c2 (θ)])
−1
=
(
F¯ (1)r (c1)
E[Y (1)(r)]
+
F¯
(2)
θ (c2)
E[Y (2)(θ)]
)
−1
.
Further, we observe that
E[Tv,c]
= E [E [Tv,c|Jv,Θv]]
≥ E
[
(E−1[T
(1)
c1 (Jv)] + E
−1[T
(2)
c2 (Θv)])
−1|Jv,Θv
]
=
deg(v)∑
r=0
piv,r
∫
∞
0
(
F¯
(1)
r (c1)
E[Y (1)(r)]
+
F¯
(2)
θ (c2)
E[Y (2)(θ)]
)−1
dHv(θ).
The desired result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3: One just note that the Assumption 3 im-
plies that
∏m
i=1 F
(1)
i,r (c1) and
∏m
i=1 F
(2)
i,θ (c2) in Eqs. (5) and (6)
are discrete NBUE, with the assumption that the NBUE property
of Y (1)i (r) and Y
(2)
i (θ) as well as E[Y
(1)
i (r)] and E[Y
(2)
i (θ)] are
decreasing in i ≥ 1, the rest of the proof can be completed very
similarly to that of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: According to Theorem 1.A4 in [22], it
holds that
F¯ (1)r (c1)T
(1)
c1 (r)
µr
⇒ ξ as c1 →∞,
where ξ is a standard exponential random variable, and “⇒" means
convergence in distribution. This means that
lim
c1→∞
P(T (1)c1 (r) ≤ µrt/F¯
(1)
r (c1))
1− e−t
= 1.
The uniformity of convergence in distribution implies
lim
c1→∞
P(T (1)c1 (r) ≤ t)
1− e−F¯
(1)
r (c1)t/µr
= 1,
and then
lim
c1→∞
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,rP(T
(1)
c1 (r) ≤ t)
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,r(1− e
−F¯
(1)
r (c1)t/µr )
= 1,
i.e.,
P(T (1)c1 (Jv) ≤ t) ∼
deg(v)∑
r=0
πv,r(1− e
−F¯
(1)
r (c1)t/µr ). (14)
Similarly, for T (2)c2 (Θv), it can be proven to have
P(T (2)c2 (Θv) ≤ t) ∼
∫
∞
0
[
1− e−F¯
(2)
θ
(c2)t/νθ
]
dHv(θ). (15)
Note that from Eq. (4), it follows that for all c1, c2 and t > 0
qv,c(t) = P(T
(1)
c1 (Jv) ≤ t) + P(T
(2)
c2 (Θv) ≤ t)−
P(T (1)c1 (Jv) ≤ t)P(T
(2)
c2 (Θv) ≤ t).
Thus, combining (15) and (14) leads to the following asymptoti-
cally equivalent form of qv,c(t).
Proof of Proposition 5: Under Assumption 2, for any 0 ≤ pu,c ≤
1, E[Tv,c] as defined in Eq. (12) satisfies
E[Tv,c] ≤
∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯v
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯
(t)
]
dt =
E[Y (2)(θ¯v)]
F¯
(2)
θ¯v
(c2)
,
where equality follows Eq. (11). By Assumption 4 and noting that
E[Jv ] ≤ deg(v) for all v, we have
E
[
(F
(1)
E[Jv]
(c1))
N
(1)
E[Jv ]
(t)
]
≥ E
[
(F
(1)
deg(v)
(c1))
N
(1)
deg(v)
(t)
]
.
Applying the two equalities in Eq. (13), we obtain the desired
bounds.
If Y (1)(deg(v)) and Y (2)(θ¯) are NBUE for all v ∈ V , from
Proposition 2 we have∫
∞
0
E
[
(F
(1)
deg(v)
(c1))
N
(1)
deg(v)
(t)
]
E
[
(F
(2)
θ¯v
(c2))
N
(2)
θ¯v
(t)
]
dt
≥
(
F¯
(1)
deg(v)(c1)
E[Y (1)(deg(v))]
+
F¯
(2)
θ¯v
(c2)
E[Y (2)(θ¯v)]
)−1
.
This completes the proof.
